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1. Introduction
Carl Schmitt famously declared that "all significant concepts of the
modem theory of the state are secularized theo]./gical concepts." (1985;
36) At least with respect to the concept of sovereignty, I believe that
Schmitt was right. The aim of this paper is to provide an outline of an argument
for this conclusion. If my argument is effective, it might shed new light on
the current state of affairs in the study of sovereignty.
Contemporary scholars writing on sovereignty can be roughly divided
between those who believe that we should get rid of the concept (because
it is inherently confusing, or essentially contested) and those who grant
many of the criticisms of the first group, but add that we nevertheless cannot
do without the concept, since much of our thinking about politics in general,
and the state in particular, seems to be stmctured by this notion. I hope to
demonstrate that much of the confusion stirrounding the notion is due
precisely to the fact that sovereignty is an inherently religious concept.
By saying this, I do not mean merely that the concept was one that was
first used in a religious context and was later transferred to other realms.
My claim is more radical: I would like to argue that if we take the concept
of sovereignty seriously, we will find that there is only one legitimate
candidate for the label of 'sovereign' and that is God. The radicalism of
the thesis can be seen if we consider one of its implications, namely that
the use of the concept in political discourse is illegitimate (unless it is used
to refer to God).
This implication might be considered as good a basis as one can get
to dismiss the thesis right from the start. For surely if it follows from the
claim that the word 'sovereignty' has been used inappropriately more
often than not in the history of (Westem) ideas, this can only be due to the
fact that the concept under scmtiny is not the one that theorists of sover-
eignty have had in mind. But this is not necessarily the case. It might well
"Sovereignty as a Religious Concept" by Siegfried Van Duffel,
The Monist, vol. 90, no. 1, pp. 126-143. Copyright © 2007, THE MONIST, Peru, Illinois 61354.
SOVEREIGNTY AS A RELIGIOUS CONCEPT 127
be that most theorists have believed that the concept of sovereignty could
be broadened so as to allow for individual human beings, princes or
popes, to be regarded as sovereign beings, but that it is precisely this
"broadening" of the concept that has brought about the theoretical
problems that we experience today.
Of course, this wider historical thesis raises many other questions.
How is it possible that so many people have been inclined to apply the
concept even when it was seen to lead to irresolvable problems? Why
have they not considered abandoning it? Is a comprehensive political
theory possible without it? I believe that we can only hope to find satis-
factory answers to these questions if we keep in mind, as we too seldom
do, that these problems are the problems of a particular cultural tradition.
In other words, we should resist the temptation to think that the problem
of delineating the sovereign is one that naturally crops up whenever
questions of politics are given serious consideration. Francis Hinsley
thought that the concept of sovereignty had not figured at all in the history
of non-European societies, except by importation from Europe. (1966; 21)
If he is right, perhaps the most interesting research question regarding the
concept of sovereignty is why most thinkers in the West, at least from a
certain point in history, in attempts to answer the more general problem of
how people can or should live together in a society, have singled out the
question of who has the right—the legitimate authority—to decide how
people should live as the cmcial one to be answered. If the thesis that sov-
ereignty is a secularized religious concept can be substantiated, this may
be a significant step forward in answering this question. At least it would
tell us where to look for an answer, namely in the influence of religion on
the culture of the West. At the same time, it would explain why people in
some other cultures have not conceptualised political issues in terms of a
quest for sovereignty. After all, it is only the God of the three so-called
"Semitic" religions (Judaism, Islam, and Christianity) that is sovereign in
any fundamental sense.
The claim that sovereignty is a secularised religious concept would
seem to fit well with a general tendency to situate the first theories of sov-
ereignty in the modem period. However, theories of sovereignty existed
long before Bodin wrote his Six livres de la republique (see, e.g., Wilks
1963, Pennington 1993). Secularisation, as I will use the term, is not
equivalent to the disappearance of the grip of religion on the public life.
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but is a phenomenon that is intemal to religion itself. This understanding
of secularisation is inspired by S. N. Balagangadhara's research into the
relation between religion and the culture ofthe West (1985,1994, 2005).
Balagangadhara has argued extensively that Christianity has constituted
the culture of the West by bringing into being a specific configuration of
leaming. Religion does this by generating a particular experience of the
world, by suggesting that the cosmos is an expression of the will of God.
One ofthe properties of religion, according to Balagangadhara's theory, is
that it strives to become unconditionally accessible to all human beings. It
does this by progressively ridding itself from the features which distin-
guish it from other religious traditions and assuming an increasingly
purely formal character with less and less specific content. (For an
excellent summary of the thesis, see De Roover 2004: 4-16). The belief
that God created each human being in his image, for example, has been
secularised in the idea that each human being is a sovereign: a claim that,
as we will see, is basic to one tradition of natural rights theories. Bala-
gangadhara's theory has many important implications, not just for the
field of religion, but also for the study of culture in general. In addition, it
is incredibly productive in generating more rewarding approaches to old
problems. This paper is an attempt to outhne such an approach to the
problems that confront us regarding the concept of sovereignty.
2. A definition of sovereignty
Although sovereignty has received various interpretations and defin-
itions, many authors would agree that there exists a core meaning. This
core can be best described as "supreme normative power with a domain."
Let me start with briefly commenting on each of the three elements in this
definition. I consider normative power to be a more precise rendering of
the more common 'authority'. Someone has normative power if he has
one or several Hohfeldian powers—if he is able to control one or more
normative relations. (Hohfeld 1946: 50-60) Nonnative power is the
power to issue binding norms with respect to something, or to define the
normative status of something. Having a normative power is compatible
with an obligation to exercise that power, or with a duty not to exercise it.
But I will assume that a sovereign also has the liberties both to exercise
and not to exercise his power. Since only an agent can issue a norm, it
follows that only agents can be sovereigns. This does not mean that a
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sovereign must be a human being. All that is required according to the
"agency criterion" is an ability to take a decision on a normative issue. An
institution could be considered an agent in the relevant sense as long as
there is a centre with decision-making capacity that can issue norms.
Several definitions include the idea that sovereignty must be over a
territory instead of the more general "domain," but this seems too restric-
tive. In the tradition of grounding natural-rights theories in the idea of
self-ownership, human beings are often considered to be sovereigns,
merely because they have normative control over a domain that minimally
comprises their minds and bodies—a domain which can be extended with
the things that they have legitimately acquired. Also, one tradition of
theories about the nature of rights (the so-called "will theory") has identi-
fied the idea of normative power as the common trait of any right.
According to this theory, being the beneficiary of someone else's duty is
not sufficient to having a right in the proper sense of the word: one must
also be able to exercise control over (i.e., enforce or waive) the relevant
duty. Herbert Hart, one of the foremost proponents of this theory, has used
the label 'small scale sovereign' for holders of such rights. (1982; 183)
Again, some social-contract theories grant that individuals can establish a
sovereign by renouncing their individual natural rights. It is not immedi-
ately clear why the domain of this sovereign should be territorially
defined. For these and other reasons, it seems better to use the neutral term
'domain'. Nothing is lost if we would find later that a sovereign must nec-
essarily control a territory, but it seems unwise to take this as a
presupposition when starting to think about sovereignty.
The distinguishing mark of a sovereign is that his normative control
is supreme. The fact that an agent has successfully established a norm is
not a sufficient ground to decide that the agent has exercised sovereignty.
Normative control is supreme if it is not controlled by another agent, or,
to be more precise, if no other agent has a normative capacity to interfere
with the sovereign's decision to create a norm. Thus an agent is sovereign
with respect to a given domain if this agent's decision to establish a norm
would unfailingly result in the existence (or validity) ofthe relevant norm.
The fact that an agent has successfully damaged a normative relation is
not sufficient to establish that his control was supreme. Normative power
is only supreme if no one had a nonnative capacity to interfere. One way
of interfering with the normative power of an agent would be to eliminate
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that power. So the demand that the normative power of a sovereign must
be supreme implies that it must be inalienable (at least in the sense that no
other agent could eliminate or restrict the relevant powers). In Hohfeldian
terminology this means that the sovereign's powers (and, presumably, his
liberties) must be protected by immunities against control by any other agent.
Supremacy is thus a very strong demand. Consider the power that a
city council has to regulate matters in the city, to control the local police
force, to raise some taxes, etc. Is this council sovereign in these respects?
Some would say that it is, because ordinary citizens cannot interfere with
its decisions, neither can a minister of the central govemment interfere
with most of the decisions of the council, etc. In another sense, however,
the normative power of the city council is not supreme since its powers
could always be taken away by the central govemment. After all, a par-
liament could decide that it is better to centralize the regulation of police
forces because it deems a centralized police force more efficient in
combating crime. If we take the demand of inalienability seriously, we
might have to conclude that even state govemments are not sovereigns,
since their powers can be taken away by the people. It is this "strong"
notion of sovereignty that the classical thinkers on the subject, Rousseau
and Hobbes, had in mind.
There are at least two reasons for insisting on the significance of this
strong notion of sovereignty. The first one is that ascribing sovereignty to
someone is often thought to have normative implications in the several
contexts in which the concept functions. For libertarians the claim that
human beings are sovereigns functions in an argument that denies the
govemment a right to impose taxes on them. In intemational politics the
sovereignty of states is a ground for demands of non-interference. For a
govemment it may justify the former's claim to the obedience of its
citizens. For separatist movements it may serve to defend their right to
secede. But this normative function of the concept of sovereignty can only
be made intelligible if one assumes that it is the strong notion of sover-
eignty that is employed in these arguments. The strong notion is, in a way,
necessary to get any normative argument based on the authority of some
people or peoples going.
A second reason for taking this stronger notion of sovereignty seriously
is that the weaker notion might, upon consideration, seem too weak to do
any of the things that we expect the concept of sovereignty to do. If the
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normative powers of a city council are a legitimate reason for granting the
council sovereignty in those matters in which its judgement is decisive,
there is nothing in the way for allowing any normative power to count as
supreme if it can be successfully exercised without assistance from other
agents and if there are at least some agents who cannot interfere with its
exercise. One conceivable route for avoiding this watering down of the
notion of sovereignty would be to hold that a sovereign has to control
everything within a given territory. Again, however, this territorial con-
ception of sovereignty can only help us in making sense ofthe sovereignty
of the city council at the expense of that of govemments at other levels. If
we consider the city council to be sovereign in this sense, a national gov-
emment would cease to be a sovereign in the territory of the city council
for the very same reason.
Who can be regarded sovereign in this strong sense? There are two
natural candidates for sovereignty: some would have it that peoples are
sovereign, but others believe that sovereignty is a property of individual
human beings. (States are of course considered to be sovereign too, but
since the strong notion of sovereignty must be able to do justificatory
work, their sovereignty cannot be sui generis, and thus must be derived
from some other agent.) However, the idea that sovereignty is a property
of people is somehow difficult to sustain, unless it is assumed that peoples
are constituted by individuals transfening their natural sovereignty to the
people. So let us begin by examining the idea of natural sovereignty of in-
dividual human beings.
3. Problems with individual sovereignty
The tradition of regarding individual human beings as naturally
having sovereignty developed at least from the late thirteenth century. In
the famous poverty debate between the Franciscans and their opponents,
the former wanted to show that it was possible for the Friars to live
without any dominium.^ The Friars Minor conceived of dominium in a
very broad sense, encompassing all kinds of "dominion" or "lordship"
such as property, but also any right that could be enforced against other
human beings of any standing (legal or otherwise). At a certain point in
the debate Pope John XXII interpreted Genesis as stating that God, before
Eve was bom, gave Adam dominion over the earth and all the creatures
that populate it. (See the bull Ad conditprem canonum, 1322) If the story
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is tme and John's interpretation of it is acceptable, we may assume that
Adam was the first human sovereign. However, there is a difficulty.
Accepting the statement that God has transfened a part of his domain to
Adam, if taken literally, would imply that Adam qua sovereign would
become equal to God. (Balagangadhara 1985: 37) For this reason, no
religious person could sincerely endorse this account. At most, such a
person could grant that God has given Adam nonnative power over the
earth, but not supreme nonnative power, because this power necessarily
remains God's. This would suggest that we have to look for secular
arguments to find a genuine sovereign (other than God).
Secular arguments for natural sovereignty of human beings also go
back to at least the 13th century. The Dominican John of Paris argued that
"lay property . . . is acquired by individual people through their own skill,
labour, and diligence," and that labourers therefore have "right and power
and valid lordship" {ius et potestatem et verum dominium) over their
property. (1971: 103; see Coleman 1983 and 1985) This type of argument
was to be canonized much later in what we now know as John Locke's
labour theory of property. But the argument is vague, and in the specific
form in which it was presented by Locke, it is clearly untenable. Locke
held that we become owners of the goods we have made because we have
"mixed" our labour with the natural resources that go into them. But as
Nozick has pointed out, it is not clear how mixing something that belongs
to us with something that does not belong to us would result in our
ownership of the totality of these goods. If I own a tin of tomato juice and
I pour it into the sea so that its molecules mingle evenly throughout it,
have I become owner of the sea because of that? (1971: 175) On top of
that, Locke simply seems to assume that we own our own labour.
Since the publication of the Two Treatises on Government, some
three hundred years ago, Locke's labour theory, despite its obvious flaws,
has exercised an enormous appeal. This signals that it has managed to
capture, albeit in an imperfect way, some deep-seated intuitions about the
origin of sovereignty. The reason for this, I submit, is that the idea of
labour is closely associated with that of creation. This would explain why
those instances of labour that most typically resemble acts of creation are
the ones where we feel most sectire in arguing that the labourer has a
property right in the result of his labour. If Mozart hadn't composed his
Paris symphony, it would not have existed. But we may still wonder why
creation should necessarily give rise to sovereignty over the thing created?
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Balagangadhara has suggested that this idea, that someone who has
created something thereby becomes sovereign ofthe thing, secularises the
belief that God is sovereign because He has created the universe.
The early theorists of private property rights, for example, argued that one
became a dominus of what one creates by virtue of being its creator. If the
producer did not have dominion over his creations, it was asked, who else
could possibly have it? Notice though that this question really becomes in-
telligible, if one asks: if God does not have dominion over His creations by
virtue of being their creator, who else has it? But, secularisation of this
question results in any number of rebuttals: why should dominion over the
creation be the self-evident relation between the product and the producer?
Why not social fame, or glory? Why should the product belong to anyone's
domain? Why do we need dominiil, etc. None of these rebuttals are possible
with respect to the theological version. (1985; 74)
Even if we would accept the idea that creation results in sovereignty over
one's creation, we are left with several problems. One of these is that, unlike
God, human beings never create anything ex nihilo. To accommodate this,
a theory that grounds sovereignty of human beings in their ability to create
things will have to loosen the criteria for what counts as "having created
something." Contemporary natural-rights theories trying to improve upon
Locke's insight have tended to see purposeful behaviour as the source of
natural rights. Unlike animals, adult human beings can act purposefully
(since they have free will), and because of that they are able to exercise
normative control. Such ptirposeful behaviour is not limited to instances
that we typically call labour. Consider someone going to the cinema and
taking a seat. In many places, if such a person mns from his seat to get a
drink, but leaves his coat, others will interpret this as a sign that the seat
"has been taken." Similarly, if an explorer discovers new land, he may
plant a flag on it, and as such acquire normative control (dominion) over
it. Any account of creation that is intended to cover these intuitions about
natural sovereignty will have to encompass things as remotely removed
from ex nihilo creation as the taking possession of a piece of land, and
even the acquisition of property in oneself. Indeed, it has been argued by
Frank Van Dun, a Belgian libertarian, that it is precisely our purposeful
behaviour that makes us owners of our own bodies and minds: Van Dun
writes that things are "created as means" by human beings:
Means are not just given to people . . . they have to be discovered, produced,
invented. They are creations of the human mind. Nothing is a means in and
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from itself, not even the human body. . . . Something becomes a means only
when somebody transforms it from a thing into a means, i.e., when
somebody starts to use it purposively, to give it a certain purpose and
includes it in his objectives. The one who first uses a thing creates it as a
means—he is the author or auctor of the thing The thing is through him,
and in that sense it is of him: as a means it arises out of him, it originates in
him. (Van Dun 1983: 37-38; my translation)
The position implied in this passage is that creation is the prototypical
form of the wider range of purposeful behaviour. God created the world
with a specific purpose in mind, and it is precisely the purposefulness of
God ("His will") which generates nonnative consequences for human
beings. Similarly, human beings act purposefully and this, according to
the proponents of this type of natural-rights theories, makes them into
sovereign beings. But if purposeful action in general is considered suffi-
cient ground for the establishment of normative power, the theory cannot
warrant that such normative power will in fact be supreme. To see this,
consider first the particular case of children. Susan Okin wrote that,
according to Nozick's entitlement theory, children are the property of
those who make them. (1989: 85) According to my analysis, this is not
necessarily tme, because the birth of children need not always be the
intended result of purposeful behaviour. But the point remains valid for
those cases where parents purposively "make" children. In fact, if pur-
poseful behaviour is a ground for ownership of something, we may conclude
that, since children are not yet purposeful agents, anyone who develops a
purpose that includes some child may become sovereign over it (not just
the parents). From this it follows that if there can be only one author of a
thing, as libertarians would maintain, the child will never become sovereign
over its own body. So when the child starts to use its own body purpo-
sively, the normative power implied in this behaviour cannot be supreme,
since there is already someone else who holds supreme power over it.
We may go further and ask why only the first person to use a thing
purposively may become sovereign over it. Our conception of sovereign-
ty tells us that there can be only one sovereign over a thing, and our
intuition regarding "creation" tells us that the act of creation brings some
thing into existence. Combining these two assumptions, we arrive at the
conclusion that the pet-son who was the first to "create" some thing is the
sovereign. But this inference fails to take into account the fact that human
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beings never create something ex nihilo. Consequently it is the wider category
of purposeful behaviour instead of the strict notion of creation that is
supposed to ground their sovereignty. The problem with this notion is that
purposeful behaviour of different agents can overlap. So if making something
part of one's purposes counts as having created something, there is really
no ground for the claim that one person cannot create something that has
akeady been created by another. So different agents can "create" the same
object, which would thus become part of the domains of different sovereigns.
However, it is conceptually impossible for something to be part ofthe
domains of more than one sovereign, for no two agents can exercise supreme
normative power over the same thing. Unless these agents necessarily have
the same will (in which case they would cease to be separate agents), they
always might issue conflicting norms. In such a case, the widened con-
ception of creation cannot justify the normative superiority of one agent's
will over another, since the respective agents are each others' equals
(since both of them equally created the relevant domain). Given that two
conflicting norms cannot be valid in the same domain, we must conclude
that neither of the agents can be a sovereign. If human beings are equal in
their capacity as purposive agents, the only way a human being could be
a sovereign would be for him to be the only human being in the universe.
4. Problems with sovereignty of peoples and princes
It is easy to see that the difficulty of overlapping domains of individ-
ual human beings, cannot be solved simply by considering only peoples or
princes to be legitimate holders of normative power since the problem lies
in the multiplicity of sovereigns. As long as there is more than one state,
this would only take the problem to another level. In as far as princes or
nations are sovereign beings, they are able to create new domain for them-
selves. In this respect a sovereign prince or a nation is no different from
the individual agents that we considered above. Instead of individual
domains potentially overlapping, it would now be domains of states that
potentially overlap. And that is enough for us to conclude that neither of
these princes or nations would be sovereign beings. This leaves us with
one possibility to consider. What if there was only one state (or one prince)
on earth? Would this be a possible candidate for a human sovereign?
Again, a plausible case for the existence of such a sovereign would
have to be a non-religious one. The problem with a religious argument for
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the existence of human princes is equivalent to that of a religious argument
for the sovereignty of individual human beings: No believer could
sincerely hold that God would have transferred part of His sovereignty to
a human prince. In case the account leaves the human prince subject to the
higher authority of God, the vahdity of his govemment ultimately
depends on its authorization by God and is thus not tmly sovereign. The
concomitant of this is that even if every other human being would be
subject to the authority of the prince, his laws would not be considered
just per se, and so an incongmence between his will and that of God
would invalidate his mle .2
If the sovereignty of an earthly prince needs a secular justification,
this rules out one traditional route of establishing the existence of such a
sovereign. In medieval political and early modem thought, there existed
two competing views on the origin of legitimate authority. On the one
hand, there was a tradition that conceived of sovereignty as derived
directly from God.^ On the other hand, many lawyers and theologians
thought that the power of mlers came from God through the people, and
so the mle of one man over others could only be justified by the consent
of the people affected by the mle.^ (Again, since any mler who was
appointed by God to mle on earth was still subject to His law, no such
mler was ever considered tmly sovereign.) In a secularised environment,
the idea that human sovereignty comes directly from God becomes un-
sustainable. But the second tradition proved to be able to survive
secularisation. In a culture that is also deeply influenced by the idea that
all people are created equal by God, it is thus hard to see how sovereign-
ty of an individual mler could be justified other than by approval of those
over whom the sovereign mles.
"Govemment by consent" can take two basic forms. Either individ-
ual people can transfer their sovereignty to a mler or "the people" (in the
singular) can mle itself. But, for our ptirposes, there is no need to distin-
guish between these two forms. The reason is that unless we believe in the
existence of "a people" other than something that comes into existence by
mutual agreement, both schemes require individual human beings to
transfer their sovereignty to the future sovereign. Any secular justification
of sovereignty has to be able to provide a "nattiralistic" account of its
origin and that means that it has to ground the origin in some agent. But
the existence of a collective agent other than one constituted by agreement
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of the individuals that are part of it has seemed utterly mysterious to most
people. For such an agent to be sovereign over the people who are part of
the collective, however, one should conceive its agency to be, in a sense,
"more real" than that of the people composing it. This is probably why
such "objectivist" accounts of nations are commonly rejected today.
(Gilbert 1998: 57) So we are left with the idea that sovereignty of a prince
or a people requires individual human beings to submit themselves to it,
or to transfer all their normative power to the mler (even if this mler is the
community to which they belong).
Contrary to what is often thought, however, it is conceptually im-
possible for an agent to transfer his natural normative power to another
agent. Consequently, it is impossible to establish a sovereign prince or
people through transfer of normative power. To see this we need to ap-
preciate the cmcial distinction between abandoning a part of a domain and
abandoning the faculty that enables an agent to acquire a domain at all.
Anyone who has exercised his natural right of appropriating a piece of
land, for example, may at a certain point abandon it. If the exercise of natural
normative power derives from one's purposeful behaviour regarding some
object, it follows that once something ceases to play a role in an agent's
intentions, his normative control over the thing also comes to an end.
Given this possibility of abandoning a part of one's domain, one might be
tempted to constme an agent's voluntary subjection to a sovereign as an
abandonment (or transfer) of his entire domain.^ But this is a mistake.
Even if it were possible for an agent to relinquish all his previous inten-
tions (or even just the ones that involved the use of any objects, including
one's body), as long as one remains a purposive agent, one's future inten-
tions will continue to entail normative control over whichever object starts
to play a role in them.
Consider the example of medieval friars who aimed at abandoning
all normative power. In the thirteenth century, several mendicant orders
came into being which required their members to forsake not just indi-
vidual property but any kind of normative power or dominium. This
included abandoning legal entitlements in general, but it was also related
to abandoning pride or even self-esteem (anything good in oneself is a gift
from the Lord and thus no ground for merit). The most important element
in this cluster of concepts associated with absence of dominium was obedience.
Monks who entered a mendicant order vowed absolute obedience to their
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superiors (and ultimately to God). But what is involved in observing such
a vow? We might be inclined to constme observing a vow as a continuous
series of acts of will. Having a free will, the monk could in principle at
any time do something other that what his vow requires him to do, but as
long as he persists in his compliance with his vow he continually
"chooses" not to and so fulfils his obligations. Voluntarily observing a
vow thus requires a constant renewal of one's intention to do so. However,
this interpretation of the vow contrasts sharply with that of the principal
theologians of both the Franciscan and the Dominican orders. They con-
sidered an agent's control over his will to be the ultimate form of
dominium, which the mendicant friars wanted to renounce. They inter-
preted the vow as requiring the monk to sunender all his dominium and
they thought that this implied a relinquishment of that that is most
essential to one's humanity, i.e., one's own will. Listen to Pecham, a thir-
teenth-century Franciscan theologian:
He only perfectly abnegates himself who fully renounces his own proper will.
For the will is in man's power to such an extent that it cannot be extorted by
anyone else. A man can therefore offer God no sacrifice so pleasing as to cut
off from himself that which is supremely his own, that is, dominium of his
own proper will. . . . This obedience which ann;' ilates all of man, keeping
nothing of the human to himself, so that the obedient man does not live
himself, but Christ in him. {Tractatus pauperis, quoted in Brett 1997: 13)
Portrayals of renunciation of dominium were not restricted to Franciscan
radicals such as Pecham. Aquinas also depicted the vow of obedience as
a surrender of one's will, and made it quite explicit that it implied a denial
of one's being. "Nothing is more desirable to man than the liberty of his
proper will. For it is by this [the liberty of his own proper will] that he is
a man and master [dominus] over other things . . . by this even that he is
master of his own actions. So that just as the man who relinquishes riches,
or persons conjoined to him, denies their being; so he who foregoes the
authoritative judgment [arbitrium] of his proper will, by which he is
master of himself, denies his own being."«
I suggest that we should take these passages at face value: If sover-
eignty is natural for human beings, if having a will implies that this will
is normatively authoritative, then the only means by which a human being
can prevent himself from being a sovereign is to terminate his existence
as a human being. Both Rousseau and Hobbes realized this. Rousseau tried
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to accommodate the agency of individual human beings with the sover-
eignty of the people by claiming human beings to have two wills, a
general and particular. {Du Contrat Social, 1,7) But (unlike God, perhaps)
human beings, if they are psychologically healthy, are never seen to have
more than one will, which is why this move is bound to remain unpersua-
sive.'' Hobbes, on the other hand, was obstinate enough in his attempt to
endorse the sovereignty of the Leviathan to bite the bullet and deny
agency to the individuals who had joined the commonwealth. For
example, he states that an individual cannot accuse the Leviathan of
breach of covenant, because any act that the sovereign does is at the same
time done by each and every person who is part of the commonwealth.
{Leviathan n , 18, 2) But against Hobbes (and against the mendicant the-
ologians) we may insist that if the will is a natural faculty of human
beings, it cannot be lost either by a vow or by contract. If the will cannot
be renounced in this way, and if acts of will imply normative control over
those things that are involved in one's projects, no human being can
subject himself to another agent (whether prince or people).
5. Conclusion
The most plausible secular account of sovereignty will conceive in-
dividual human beings as sovereigns. But if a sovereign acquires a domain
by creating it, and if human beings are understood to create things by de-
veloping intentions regarding them, there is no guarantee that the domains
of different sovereigns will not overlap. But since there can be no more
than one sovereign in the same domain, multiple human beings cannot
possibly be sovereign. Furthermore, since it is not possible to transfer
natural sovereignty either by vow or contract, it follows that the only
condition under which a human being could be a sovereign would be if he
were the only agent in the universe. But since normative authority is
essential to sovereignty and because such normative power can only be
directed to other agents, such a demand (i.e., that there be no other agents)
detracts all substantive content from the conception. We may thus conclude
that it is not possible for a human being to be a sovereign.
Of course, this conclusion only holds on condition that one accepts
the demand that a sovereign must be supreme in the sense I have proposed.
But it may be objected that my argument—if it succeeds in demonstrating
that this strong conception of sovereignty is untenable—only shows that
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the broader interpretation of sovereignty is the more sensible one. Never-
theless, if I am right that we need the strong competition to make
intelligible the nonnative role ofthe notion in moral and political theories,
the rejection of this conception has wide-ranging consequences. For it will
follow that no theory in which sovereignty functions as a basic concept is
defensible. Our rejection of sovereignty as a basic concept (i.e., a concept
from which the other normative concepts in the theory are derived) may
allow us to give a partial answer to the question whether a moral theory
can be rights-based. No theory can be rights-based if the relevant rights
are derived from the supposed sovereignty of human beings. Similarly, we
may say that no theory in which popular sovereignty functions as a basic
concept is sound (no moral or political theory can be sovereignty-based).
The argument is also productive in raising new questions for further
research. If it is indeed tme that only the God of the three Semitic religions
is a sovereign, why did the concept not disappear when religion ceased to
be the acceptable framework in which to answer questions of moral and
political legitimacy? Why does the question of who holds sovereignty
continue to seem one of the most basic in political theory? Is the notion
intelligible in cultures that have not been dominated by any of the three
Semitic religions? In other words, what may look at first glance as a
negative argument against a cluster of normative theories could be viewed
as a beginning of a partial description of the culture in which those
theories continue to hold sway. As such, it raises new questions: How is
the seeming intelligibility of these theories connected with culturally
specific conceptions of human agency? To what extent do these concep-
tions influence political life in the culture in which they are generally
accepted? Answering these questions will, of course, be exceedingly
difficult, but I hope that the preceding pages have made the project less
desperate than it might seem at first glance.
Siegfried Van Dujfel
Ghent University (Belgium)
and University of Groningen (Netherlaruis)
NOTES
*I would like to thank professor S. N. Balagangadhara and the editor of this issue
for helpful comments on a previous version of this paper.
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1. The argument in this section owes much to the section on natural rights in Bala-
gangadhara 1985. Parts of the following paragraphs draw on and to some extent amend
views that are presented in more detail in my 2004a.
2. I have discussed this in more detail in my 2004b.
3. Most notorious were Papalists such as Augustinus Triumphus de Ancona. See, also,
Giles of Rome (2004). On this tradition, see Wilks (1964), McCready (1973,1974,1975,
1977). See, further. Bums (1992), Figgis (1896).
4. The most important authors in this movement were Pierre D'Ailly, Jean Gerson,
Jacques Almain, and John Mair. One of Almain's tracts has been translated in Bums
(1997). See, further. Black (1979), Bums (1991), Oakley (1984), and Tiemey (1982).
5. Abandonment and transfer are not the same thing, of course, but to make the
argument less complex, it is easier to use the case of abandonment.
6. Aquinas, De perfectione spiritualis vitae ch. XI, quoted in Brett (1997: 14). There
exists a full English translation of the treatise (Proctor 1902), but this passage is clearer in
Brett's rendering.
7. The distinction between God's general and His particular will was crafted to solve
the theological problem of redemption: see Riley 1988 for the historical background.
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